VTX 1 · core · beta draft d03
VTX 1 Wire Specification: core
§15Security considerations
VTX's security rests on three structural choices: no in-band control, no code on the client, and a trusted zone the server cannot reach. The rules below keep those properties intact.
| Threat | Mitigation |
|---|---|
Content that reprograms the client (the classic cat of a hostile file) |
Control exists only as frame types; text in ops and cells is never interpreted as commands |
| Hostile server exhausting a client | Client limits: max_frame, windows, scene_nodes, glyph_slots, cache_bytes, max_update, max_clip, and at most 8 pending zone and clipboard requests; Section 14 lists the error for each |
| Content triggering network access | Clients never fetch on behalf of content; links open only through the open_url permission |
| Spoofed system UI | The trusted zone cannot be drawn into or themed; CLAIM is labelled as claimed |
| Approval answered for a different request | The answer carries the digest of the request as shown; the server checks it |
| Repudiated approval | uv approvals carry a WebAuthn assertion or a smart-card signature over the request digest |
| Server reusing an approval answer | Approval IDs MUST be unique within a session; servers reject a second answer to the same ID |
| Deceptive command text (bidirectional overrides, invisible characters) | Zone text shows control characters and isolates bidirectional runs |
| Clipboard hijacking | Silent writes only right after user input; reads always need permission |
| Cross-server tracking through the cache | The resource cache is partitioned per server identity |
| Stolen resume token | 256-bit, single-use, rotated, only ever sent inside the encrypted session |
| Lost or stolen smart card | The card's PIN, revocation checked at every sign-in, and the removal policy that detaches the session when the card is pulled (Section 5) |
| Downgrade | TLS 1.3 only; a mismatched ALPN aborts; HELLO never in 0-RTT |
| Replayed input on changed UI | seen lets the application discard actions on stale state |
| A web page posing as a VTX client | Servers check the Origin of browser connections (Section 2); zone guarantees hold only for clients whose code the server does not supply (Section 12) |
| Escape sequences hidden in scene text | Control characters make a scene op invalid; only the VT engine turns terminal output into ops (Section 7) |
Further protections defined elsewhere in this specification:
- Token relay. OIDC ID tokens are bound to the server's host and a per-connection seed through the nonce, and passkey assertions to the URI's host through the rpId (Section 5).
- Ambiguous payloads. Duplicate map keys make a payload invalid, so every decoder reads the same request (Section 3).
- Paste injection. The VT engine strips control characters from pastes before delivering them (Section 8).
- Font parsers. Font files are sanitised before use (Section 10).
- Links. Only
https,httpandmailtolinks open, always through the trusted zone (Sections 8, 9 and 12). - Unauthenticated links. Noise XX pins the server key on first use and shows its fingerprint (Section 2).
Agents. VTX guarantees that an approval was really given by the user, for exactly the request shown. Deciding which actions need approval, and enforcing that, remains the application's job.
Privacy. HELLO reveals display metrics, locale, time zone, input devices and client software, and input timestamps reveal typing rhythm. Clients MAY coarsen these values when the user asks for less fingerprinting, for example by rounding pixel sizes, rounding t to 10 ms or more, and leaving out device names. Frame sizes and timing can reveal keystrokes to an observer of the network path; a client that cares pads records (TLS 1.3 record padding, QUIC PADDING frames) and sends keys on a fixed tick.